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NOTES 
A Prior Restraint by Any Other Name: The Judicial Response 
to Media Challenges of Gag Orders Directed at Trial 
Participants 
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 1 the Supreme Court identified 
the primary purpose of the first amendment as the protection and en-
couragement of an "unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing 
about of political and social changes."2 By identifying public debate 
as the focus of first amendment protections,3 New York Times implied 
a conception of the first amendment that protects all elements of pub-
lic debate: the speaker, the channel for the speaker's message, and the 
listener.4 
The Supreme Court has consistently extended first amendment 
coverage to speakers5 and channels for speech. 6 First amendment pro-
tection of receivers' rights, however, has been ambiguous. 7 First 
amendment doctrines thus remain primarily communicator-oriented. 
In particular, prior restraint doctrine assumes restriction of speakers 
previous to the dissemination of their speech to be the primary evil at 
which the first amendment is directed. 8 Thus, prior restraint doctrine 
is concerned only with restrictions directed at communicators, and 
only with those restrictions that are previous to the dissemination of 
the speaker's message. The communicator orientation of this ap-
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
2. 376 U.S. at 269 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)). 
3. See Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amend-
ment, 19 HARV. L. REv. 1, 12 (1965); Kalven, The New York Times Case; A Note on "The 
Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 SUP. Cr. REV. 191, 204-10. 
4. See infra notes 111-12 and accompanying text. 
5. The Court's protective stance toward speakers is most evident in its protection of unpopu-
lar or offensive speakers. See, Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (jacket bearing message 
"fuck the draft" was protected by the first amendment); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 
(1969) (speech of Ku Klux Klan member could be restricted only when the danger of inciting a 
crowd to violence was substantial and imminent); see also Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th 
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978) (upheld right of Nazi group to march through the 
village of Skokie, Illinois); Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of Am., 69 Ill. 2d 605, 
373 N.E.2d 21 (1978) (same). 
6. See, e.g., Hague v. C.1.0., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939) (opinion of Roberts, J.) (invalidated 
ordinance forbidding public meetings in streets and public places without a permit) ("[S]treets 
and parks ... have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of 
mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thought between citizens, and 
discussing public questions."). 
7. See infra notes 115-33 and accompanying text. 
8. See infra notes 20-26 and accompanying text. 
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preach becomes problematic when potential receivers of speech claim 
a right to receive the speech of willing speakers. 
This problem is illustrated by recent efforts of media organizations 
to challenge judicial orders that restrict the speech of trial partici-
pants, including trial attorneys, witnesses, and the parties themselves.9 
In such cases, the media assert a right to receive the potential speech 
of the trial participants, rather than a right to speak themselves. How-
ever, courts have responded to these challenges under traditional com-
municator- oriented prior restraint analysis. Several courts have 
characterized these orders as prior restraints in order to examine them 
under the prohibitive prior restraint analysis, 10 while others have 
found that such orders do not constitute prior restraints upon the me-
dia, and thus need only be examined under a "reasonableness" test. 11 
The result of this split among the courts is an "all-or-nothing" scena-
rio, in which participant-directed gag orders are either struck down as 
prior restraints or upheld under a deferential standard of review. 12 
Restrictions directed at the media, on the other hand, such as re-
strictions prohibiting the media from publishing information it pos-
sesses, are virtually always found to be unconstitutional prior 
restraints. 13 By directing orders at trial participants, rather than at 
the media, courts have found a back door for restricting communica-
tion about trial activities without incurring the prohibitive scrutiny of 
prior restraint doctrine. 14 For example, during a particularly contro-
versial murder trial, one Arizona trial court forbade the media from 
contacting any trial participants, including attorneys, jurors, or par-
9. A highly publicized example of such a restriction is the order forbidding Zsa Zsa Gabor 
from speaking to members of the press about her trial for assault of a police officer. Zsa Zsa is 
Warned by the Judge: Hold Your Tongue, L.A. Times, Sept. 16, 1989, § 2, at 1, col. 4. 
A gag order restricting trial participant speech constitutes a governmental intrusion between 
a willing speaker (the trial participant) and a willing listener (the media). Challenges to orders 
are thus distinct from efforts by a willing listener to compel information from an unwilling 
speaker. The Supreme Court has declined to interpret the first amendment as a right to force 
speech from an unwilling speaker, particularly in the face of countervailing public policy con· 
cems such as privacy and confidentiality guarantees. Cf. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 
(1978) (plurality holding that press had no right of access to government-controlled prison facili· 
ties). For further discussfon, see infra notes 156-57 and accompanying text. 
10. See, e.g., Journal Publishing Co. v. Mechem, 801 F.2d 1233, 1236 (10th Cir. 1986); Co· 
lumbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 238-42 (6th Cir. 1975); Connecticut Magazine 
v. Moraghan, 676 F. Supp. 38, 42-44 (D. Conn. 1987). For a discussion of these eases, see infra 
notes 49-61 and accompanying text. 
11. See, e.g., In re Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d 603, 610 (2d Cir. 1988). For a discussion of 
this line of cases, see infra notes 34-44 and accompanying text. 
· 12. See infra note 67 and accompanying text. 
13. See Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). 
14. If the participants themselves challenge the orders, courts must examine the orders as 
prior restraints. However, the courts' practice of imposing the orders on the participants may 
imply that courts assume that participants are less likely to challenge restraints than are media 
organizations, or perhaps that prior restraints on individuals are less disfavored than restraints 
upon the press. See infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text. 
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ties. 15 Upon reconsideration, however, the court rewrote the order to 
prohibit those parties from "be[ing] in contact with the media."16 
When a radio station challenged the order as a restraint of its right to 
receive the potential speech of the trial participants, the Arizona 
Supreme Court upheld the order under a "reasonableness" test.17 In 
contrast, the same decision applied the far more exacting prior re-
straint analysis to an order that prohibited the media from televising 
courtroom sketches without judicial approval. 18 Thus, a mere seman-
tic distinction - between an order facially directed at the media and 
an order facially directed at the participants - enabled the trial court 
to restrict pretrial publicity without incurring the prohibitive degree of 
scrutiny that would be warranted by a direct restriction of the media. 
Gag orders directed at trial participants do not directly intrude into 
the media's editorial process, but instead result in a reduction of the 
total communication available regarding trial proceedings. In this 
way, participant-directed gag orders are effective, albeit indirect, re-
straints upon the media. This Note examines the dynamics of these 
participant-directed restrictions and their consequent effect upon the 
media. Part I examines participant-directed gag orders in relation to 
traditional prior restraint doctrine. After discussing the history of 
prior restraint doctrine and the present standard of prior restraint 
analysis, Part I relates efforts by courts to apply. prior restraint doc-
trine to media challenges of participant-directed gag orders. Part I 
demonstrates that judicial application of prior restraint doctrine to 
these challenges leads to arbitrary results: if the court characterizes 
the gag order as a prior restraint, it almost always strikes the order 
down; if the court holds that the gag order is not a prior restraint, it 
need only examine the order under a "reasonableness" test, a deferen-
tial standard that most judicially imposed gag orders can pass. Fi-
nally, Part I explores the rationales for prior restraint doctrine and 
examines their relevance to participant-directed gag orders. This Part 
concludes that participant-directed gag orders are not prior restraints 
of the media, but that such restraints pose many of the same first 
amendment problems that prior restraint doctrine was intended to 
alleviate. 
15. KPNX Broadcasting Co. v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 246, 249, 678 P.2d 431, 434 
(1984). The case involved one of a series of killings related to organized crime. 139 Ariz. at 249, 
678 P.2d at 434. 
16. 139 Ariz. at 249, 678 P.2d at 434 (emphasis omitted). 
17. The court asked "whether the restrictions imposed are reasonable and whether the inter-
ests of the [state] override the very limited incidental effect of the [order] on First Amendment 
rights." 139 Ariz. at 256, 678 P.2d at 441 (alterations in original) (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. 
v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 616 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)). 
18. The court held the order to the "heavy presumption" against prior restraints, and ex-
amined "(l) the gravity of harm posed by media coverage; (2) whether other measures short of a 
prior restraint would have adequately protected the fair-trial right; and (3) how effectively the 
sketch order avoided the threat to a fair trial." 139 Ariz. at 251, 678 P.2d at 436. 
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Part II exainffies the rights on which media organizations base 
their challenges to participant-directed gag orders: a public right to 
receive information, the press' right to gather news, and a public right 
of access to trial. This Part concludes that the public's right to receive 
information may provide a basis for media challenges of participant-
directed gag orders. Under a public debate conception of the first 
amendment, this right must be protected in order to provide the public 
with the information it needs to function as an institutional check 
upon the judiciary's performance. 
Part III suggests two alternative approaches courts might employ 
to protect the public's right to receive information from trial partici-
pants. First, courts could continue to apply prior restraint analysis to 
media challenges of participant-directed gag orders, but could create 
an exception to traditional standing doctrine that would allow the me-
dia to assert the rights of the restrained speakers. Given the highly 
restrictive nature of prior restraint analysis, however, such an ap-
proach would likely prove overinclusive, foreclosing even those par-
ticipant-directed orders that are necessary to preserve the 
administration of justice. Second, courts could recognize media 
claims based on a public right to receive information, and could ac-
cord. standing to the media based on a financial injury caused by the 
information restriction. The court should examine such claims under 
a standard of "heightened" scrutiny, based on the functional utility of 
the speech at issue. This Note advocates that this second approach be 
applied regardless of whether the challenger is a speaker or a receiver. 
A single, standardized test would enable courts to protect the "public 
debate" envisioned in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 19 
I. PARTICIPANT-DIRECTED GAG ORDERS AND PRIOR 
REsTRAINT DOCTRINE 
The majority of the courts that have faced media challenges to par-
ticipant-directed gag orders have examined those orders under tradi-
tional prior restraint analysis. This Part explores the relationship 
between gag orders and prior restraint doctrine. Section A briefly re-
lates the origin of prior restraint doctrine and the standard of review 
applicable to prior restraints. Section B details the judiciary's current 
application of prior restraint doctrine to media challenges of partici-
pant-directed gag orders. Section B concludes that prior restraint 
doctrine is inapplicable to media claims grounded in receivers' rights. 
The final section evaluates participant-directed gag orders in terms of 
the foundational assumptions of prior restraint doctrine. This section 
concludes that although participant-directed gag orders do not them-
19. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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selves fit within the framework of prior restraints, they do implicate 
the foundational premises that underlie prior restraint doctrine. 
A. The Origin of Prior Restraint Analysis 
Prior restraint doctrine traces its origins to Near v. Minnesota ex 
rel. Olsen. 20 In Near, the Supreme Court struck down a statute that 
allowed the state to enjoin publication of "malicious, scandalous, and 
defamatory newspaper[s]."21 The Court held that "it has been gener-
ally, if not universally, considered that it is the chief purpose of the 
[freedom of the press] guaranty to prevent previous restraints upon 
publication."22 After conducting a functional analysis of the statutory 
injunction, the Court concluded that the statute's "operation and ef-
fect"23 was to suppress speech in the fashion of traditional prior licens-
ing and injunction arrangements.24 Accordingly, the Court struck 
down the order as .an unconstitutional prior restraint. Although the 
Court claimed that prior restraints were not the sole concern of the 
first amendment,25 it implied that characterizing the order as a prior 
restraint was a prerequisite to finding the law unconstitutional. 26 
The Supreme Court set forth the current standard for review of 
prior restraints in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart. 27 Nebraska 
Press Association held that a court order prohibiting publication of a 
criminal defendant's confession constituted an unconstitutional prior 
restraint. According to the Court, a prior restraint on the press may 
be employed to protect the integrity of criminal proceedings only if 
"the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such 
invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger."28 In ap-
plying this test, a trial court must consider: "(a) the nature and extent 
of pretrial news coverage; (b) whether other measures would be likely 
20. 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
21. 283 U.S. at 701-02. 
22. 283 U.S. at 713. 
23. 283 U.S. at 713. 
24. See 283 U.S. at 718-19. Critics argue that the statute at issue in Near, which enjoined 
publishers only from printing future malicious and defamatory speech, rather than enjoining 
publication altogether, was not particularly analogous to a historical licensing.system. Facially, 
"it was a system for subsequent punishment by contempt procedure." Emerson, The Doctrine of 
Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 648, 654: (1955). See also Blasi, Toward a Theory 
of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 MINN. L. REV. 11, 16 (1981) (statute did not estab-
lish a licensing system because publishers were not required to seek approval prior to publica-
tion). Emerson argues that, in practice, publishers would clear doubtful material in advance, 
causing the judge to function essentially as a censor. Emerson, supra, at 654. 
25. 283 U.S. at 716. 
26. See Jeffries, Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409, 416 (1983). 
27. 427 U.S. 539 (1976). The Nebraska Press Assn. opinion is famous for its statement that 
"[i]f it can be said that a threat of criminal or civil sanctions after publication 'chills' speech, 
prior restraint 'freezes' it at least for a time." 427 U.S. at 559. 
28. 427 U.S. at 562 (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), ajfd., 
341 U.S. 494 (1951)). 
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to mitigate the effects of unrestrained pretrial publicity; and (c) how 
effectively a restraining order would operate to prevent the threatened 
danger."29 The Nebraska Press Association Court noted that previous 
restraints on publication come to the test bearing a heavy presumption 
against validity.30 In application, this presumption has caused the 
prior restraint test to function as a virtual ban on prior restraint of the 
press.31 
B. Judicial Treatment of Media Challenges to Participant-Directed 
Gag Orders 
The Supreme Court in Nebraska Press Association suggested that 
means other than direct restraints of the press may be appropriate to 
restrict communication regarding trial proceedings. Among these al-
ternative methods, the Court suggested that judges might restrict the 
communications of trial participants when necessary to avoid exces-
sive or prejudicial pretrial publicity.32 Such orders are becoming in-
creasingly common in the courts, and are thus subject to challenge by 
media organizations who assert that these orders restrict their ability 
to report on trial proceedings.33 Despite the implication of the Ne-
braska Press Association Court that such restrictions are preferable. to 
media-directed orders precisely because they are not prior restraints, 
courts have tended to examine media challenges of participant-di-
rected restraints under traditional prior restraint doctrine. Because 
media organizations are grounding their claims in a right to receive 
information, rather than a right to speak, courts' attempts to deal with 
these challenges under a communicator-oriented standard have proved 
problematic. 
One group of cases has recognized that the media's receiver-rights 
29. 427 U.S. at 562. The Court modelled its standard on Learned Hand's version of the 
"clear and present danger" test as applied in United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 
1950), ajfd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 427 U.S. at 562. 
30. 427 U.S. at 562. 
31. See Nebraska Press Assn., 427 U.S. at 570-71 (White, J. concurring); see also L. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 858-59 (2d ed. 1989); Goodale, The Press Ungagged; The 
Practical Effect on Gag Order Litigation of Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 29 STAN. L. 
REV. 497, 498 (1977); cf. Schmidt, Nebraska Press Association: An Expansion of Freedom and 
Contraction of Theory, 29 STAN. L. REV. 431 (1977). Schmidt finds the fatality of the test inher-
ent in the test itself. According to Schmidt, the degree of certainty required to meet the Ne-
braska Press Assn. test will never be met by the necessarily speculative determinations preceding 
gag orders. Id. at 465. 
32. 427 U.S. at 564. The Nebraska Press Assn. Court rested its support on "[p]rofessional 
studies ... recommending that trial courts in appropriate cases limit what the contending law-
yers, the police, and witnesses may say to anyone." 427 U.S. at 564 (citing American Bar Associ-
ation Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Fair Trial and Free Press 2-15 (Approved Draft 
1968)). 
33. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1852 (Ga. Super. Ct. 1981); Ramsey 
v. Georgia Gazette, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1658 (Ga. Super. Ct. 1981), revd., 248 Ga. 528, 284 
S.E.2d 386 (1981); see also Sack, Principle and Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 29 STAN. L. 
REV. 411, 427-29 (1977). 
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claims do not fit coherently within the communicator-oriented prior 
restraint standard. These courts have held that participant-directed 
gag orders do not constitute prior restraints of the media and therefore 
need only meet a standard of reasonableness.34 In these cases, the di-
rection of the order is dispositive of the applicable level of review: if 
the order is not directed at the press, it cannot constitute a prior re-
straint on the press. 35 
The Second Circuit adopted this position in In re Dow Jones & 
Co. 36 The trial at issue implicated public figures, including U.S. Rep-
resentative Mario Biaggi, in a conspiracy with Wedtech Industries. In 
an effort to minimize pretrial publicity, the district court prohibited 
parties and attorneys from making extrajudicial statements to the me-
dia. 37 Media organizations challenged this order as a prior restraint 
on their right to gather news. 38 
The Second Circuit held that the characterization of a gag order 
depends on the status of the challenging party: a gag order constitutes 
a prior restraint when challenged by the silenced individual, but not 
when challenged by a third party.39 Although the court found that the 
restraint at issue "limit[ed] the flow of information readily available to 
the news agencies,"40 it held that the order was less intrusive upon the 
media than an order threatening direct sanction of the news agen-
cies.41 While an order directed at the media would be examined under 
the prior restraint standard, an indirect restriction need only be ex-
amined under a test of whether there existed "a 'reasonable likelihood' 
that pretrial publicity w[ould] prejudice a fair trial."42 The Second 
Circuit found that the district court's order was supported by evidence 
of a threat to the administration of justice, that the lower court had 
34. See, e.g., In re Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1988) (discussed infra at notes 36-
44 and accompanying text); Radio & Television News Assn. v. United States Dist. Court, 781 
F.2d 1443 (9th Cir. 1986); KPNX Broadcasting Co. v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 246, 678 P.2d 
431 (1984). 
35. If the orders were challenged by the participants themselves, they would generally be 
considered prior restraints. See infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text. 
36. 842 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1988), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 377 (1988). 
37. 842 F.2d at 606. The district court order prohibited all parties from making "[any] ex-
trajudicial statement concerning this case (1) to any person associated with a public communica-
tions media, or (2) that a reasonable person would expect to be communicated to a public 
communications media." The court indicated that statements "without elaboration or character-
ization" of "(l) the general nature of an allegation or defense; (2) information contained in the 
public record; (3) the scheduling or result of any step in the proceedings;" or statements 
"[e]xplaining, without characterization, the contents or substance of any motion or step in the 
proceedings, to the extent such motion or step is a matter of public record" would not be in-
cluded within this prohibition. 842 F.2d at 606. 
38. 842 F.2d at 608. 
39. 842 F.2d at 608-09. 
40. 842 F.2d at 608. 
41. 842 F.2d at 608. 
42. 842 F.2d at 610 (citing Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966)). 
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adequately considered less restrictive alternatives, 43 and that a deter-
mination of the order's effectiveness was unnecessary, as "the re-
straining order being directed at trial participants is undisputably 
effective. "44 
The Dow Jones opinion identifies a critical distinction between di-
rect restriction of the press and similar restriction of trial participants. 
As the court noted, the participant-directed gag order lacks the "most 
offensive aspect of a prior restraint [-] the censorship involved by 
forbidding the dissemination of information already known to the 
press and therefore public."45 Rather than merely depriving the press 
of information, direct restraints upon publication "are a direct inter-
ference with the constitutionally guaranteed structure of a free 
press."46 A direct sanction of the media interferes with the editorial 
process, doing "violence ... to the constitutional role of independent 
publishers."47 In contrast, participant-directed orders restrict the to-
tal flow of communication, but do not carry the intrusive connotations 
of media-directed orders. For this reason, the Second Circuit held 
that media challenges to participant-directed gag orders need only be 
examined under a standard of "reasonableness."48 
A second line of cases, however, has held that participant-directed 
orders constitute prior restraints of the press.49 Columbia Broadcast-
ing System v. Young so involved a gag order imposed on all parties, as 
well as their "relatives, close friends, and associates," to a civil suit 
over police shootings of students at Kent State University.51 In re-
sponse to a challenge by CBS, the Sixth Circuit held that the gag order 
constituted a prior restraint on CBS' right to gather news. Although 
the order was not directed at media organizations, the court held that 
43. 842-F.2d at 611. The court listed several less restrictive alternatives, including "change 
of venue, trial postponement, a searching voir dire, emphatic jury instructions, and sequestration 
of jurors." 842 F.2d at 611. 
44. 842 F.2d at 612 n.l. 
45. 842 F.2d at 608. See, e.g., Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603 (1989) (striking down 
statute prohibiting the press from publishing the names of victims of sexual assaults). 
46. Sack, supra note 33, at 427. 
47. Id. See Be Vier, An Informed Public, an Informing Press: The Search for a Constitutional 
Principle, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 482, 499 (1980) ("Free political speech may well serve the value of 
informed debate, but the only inevitable consequences of permitting punishment or censorship of 
publication is loss of freedom. On the other hand, the only inevitable consequence of a denial of 
access to governmental information is less information.") (footnote omitted). 
48. 842 F.2d at 609-10. 
49. See, e.g., Journal Publishing Co. v. Mechem, 801 F.2d 1233 (10th Cir. 1986); Columbia 
Broadcasting Sys. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1975); Connecticut Magazine v. Moraghan, 
676 F. Supp. 38 (D. Conn. 1987). The Second Circuit's opinion in In re Dow Jones explicitly 
rejects this line of cases. 842 F.2d at 608-09; see supra note 40-41 and accompanying text. 
50. 522 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1975). 
51. 522 F.2d at 236. The order specifically forbade "all counsel and Court personnel, all 
parties concerned with this litigation, whether plaintiffs or defendants, their' relatives, close 
friends, and associates" from discussing the case "in any manner whatsoever" with the news 
media. 522 F.2d at 236. 
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"significant and meaningful sources of information concerning the 
case [were] effectively removed from them and their representa-
tives."s2 The court found that this curtailment of the press' right to 
gather news warranted application of strict scrutiny. s3 Although CBS 
preceded Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, s4 it applied a standard 
similar to the prior restraint test ultimately established by the Supreme 
Court. First, the CBS court required that the speech must pose a 
"clear and present danger, or a serious or imminent threat" to the 
administration of justice, with due consideration for the "heavy pre-
sumption" against the constitutional validity of a prior restraint. ss In 
addition, the restriction must be "narrowly drawn" and imposed only 
in the absence of "reasonable alternatives ... having a lesser impact on 
first amendment freedoms."S6 The court found that the limited threat 
pretrial press coverage posed to the administration of justice failed to 
overcome the presumed invalidity of such an order. s7 
Other courts have followed the Sixth Circuit in categorizing par-
ticipant-directed gag orders as prior restraints upon media rights. For 
example, the Tenth Circuit, in Journal Publishing Co. v. Mechem, 58 
sustained a publisher's challenge to an order prohibiting jurors from 
post-trial press interviews, on the ground that the order was an uncon-
stitutional prior restraint of the publisher's first amendment right to 
gather news.s9 Similarly, in Connecticut Magazine v. Moraghan, 60 a 
district court applied CBS' strict scrutiny standard when a publishing 
company challenged a court order forbidding trial attorneys from dis-
cussing a controversial murder case with the media. The court con-
52. 522 F.2d at 239. 
53. 522 F.2d at 240. 
54. 427 U.S. 539 (1976). 
55. 522 F.2d at 238. 
56. 522 F.2d at 238. 
57. 522 F.2d at 240. 
58. 801 F.2d 1233 (10th Cir. 1986). 
59. 801 F.2d at 1236-37. Journal Publishing Co. involved a controversial trial that ultimately 
found the City of Albuquerque and its police force guilty of civil rights violations. Following the 
trial, the judge admonished jurors: "You should not discuss your verdict after you leave here 
with anyone. If anyone tries to talk to you about it, or wants to talk to you about it, let me know. 
If they wish [to] take the matter up with me, why, they may do so, but otherwise, don't discuss it 
with anyone." 801 F.2d at 1235. The judge rejected a request by Journal Publishing Company 
to rescind or modify the order. 801 F.2d at 1235. 
60. 676 F. Supp. 38 (D. Conn. 1987). The criminal defendant in Connecticut Magazine was 
charged with dismembering his wife and putting her head and limbs through a wood chipping 
machine. The court wryly noted, "Not surprisingly, the case has attracted some substantial 
attention in the media." 676 F. Supp. at 39. To curb media involvement, the court ordered: 
No attorney involved in the prosecution or the defense of this case, under order of this court 
and under pain of the contempt powers the Court has, will be permitted to make any public 
statements to any member of the media about this trial while it is in progress. That means 
that from today on until such time as the case terminates and by that the Court means until 
a verdict is returned. 
676 F. Supp. at 39. 
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eluded that the order· constituted a "prior restraint on the right to 
gather news and derivatively on publication."61 Although the order 
was not a direct restraint on publication, the court held that its effect 
upon the press' right to publish warranted application of the prior re-
straint test to find the order unconstitutional. 
Although this second line of cases recognized that the media has 
an interest in receiving the communications of trial participants, it did 
so under the communicator-oriented prior restraint standard. By ap-
plying prior restraint doctrine to receiver-oriented claims, these courts 
failed to recognize the distinction between restrictions that directly in-
trude into the editorial process and restrictions that limit the total 
amount of available communication without intervening in editorial 
decisions. Accordingly, the CBS line of cases is inherently inconsis-
tent with prior restraint doctrine in its traditional form. 
However, the first line of cases, which rejected prior restraint anal-
ysis of media challenges to participant-directed gag orders, made judi-
cial review of gag orders dependent on the status of the challenging 
party. Although a participant-directed restraint is not a prior re-
straint of the challenging media, it is a prior restraint of the partici-
pant toward whom the order is directed. 62 As a result, the same order 
may be subject to prior restraint analysis if challenged by the partici-
pant toward whom it is directed, and subject only to a "reasonable-
ness" test when challenged by media organizations. For example, in 
Radio and Television News Association v. United States District 
Court, 63 a district court had forbidden trial attorneys from making ex-
trajudicial statements to the press during the trial of a former FBI 
agent charged with passing classified documents to Soviet agents. 64 
When the defendant's attorney challenged the order as a restraint of 
his rights as a communicator, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals la-
belled the order a prior restraint and struck it down under the Ne-
61. 676 F. Supp. af42. 
62. See Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 536 F.2d 1001 (3d Cir. 1976) (sustained trial 
counsel's challenge to a gag order restricting counsel from disseminating information obtained 
through a deposition as an unconstitutional prior restraint); Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059 (7th 
Cir. 1970) (sustained challenge by counsel and defendants to an order restricting them from 
speaking to the press about the trial). In In re Russell, 726 F.2d 1007 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 
U.S. 837 (1984), the Fourth Circuit implied that prior restraints may be disfavored only when 
directed against the media. However, such a position would be inconsistent with the Supreme 
Court's edict that the media has no rights that are greater than those afforded the general public. 
Cf Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. I, 10 (1978) (discussed infra at notes 156-58 and accom-
panying text). See Freedman & Starwood, Prior Restraints on Freedom of Expression by Defen-
dants and Defense Attorneys, 29 STAN. L. REV. 607, 618-19 (1977) (Court's disfavor of prior 
restraint of the press is inconsistent with its holding in Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974), 
that the press merits no special first amendment privileges). 
63. 781 F.2d 1443 (9th Cir. 1986). 
64. 781 F.2d at 1444. 
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braska Press Association . test. 65 When an organization of broadcast 
journalists later challenged a modified version of the same order, the 
court held the order was not a prior restraint, and upheld the order 
under a "reasonableness" test. 66 As Radio and Television illustrates, 
prior restraint doctrine does not accommodate receivers' rights, and is 
accordingly insensitive to restriction of the communication process as 
a whole. 
The present circuit split thus produces an "all-or-nothing" scena-
rio for media challenges to participant-directed gag orders. If a court 
characterizes an order as a prior restraint, the order must survive a 
virtually prohibitive presumption against prior restraints. If the court 
does not characterize the order as a prior restraint, it need only ex-
amine the order under a "reasonableness" test, a standard that re-
quires only a "reasonable likelihood" that pret_rial publicity ·will 
endanger the administration of justice, and only that the order be 
"reasonable," rather than "narrowly constructed."67 
Neither standard adequately protects the media's interest in receiv-
ing communication. Since participant-directed orders do not directly 
intrude into the editorial process, they do not appear to warrant the 
prohibitive degree of scrutiny of the prior restraint test. However, the 
restriction on communication available to the media implicates first 
amendment concerns to a greater extent than implied by the "reasona-
bleness" standard. In order to accommodate the media's interest in 
receiving information, courts must establish some nµddle ground. 
C. Application of the Prior Restraint Doctrine to Participant-
Directed Gag Orders 
Media challenges to participant-directed gag orders represent a 
concern for the communication loss that results from such orders. 
This concern is the link between media challenges and prior restraint 
doctrine: both are concerned with a reduction of communication. 
The heavy constitutional presumption against prior restraints as-
sumes that prior restraints are inherently more speech-suppressive 
65. Levine v. United States Dist. Court, 764 F.2d 590, 599 (9th Cir. ·1985), cert. denied, 476 
U.S. 1158 (1986). 
66. The court examined "whether the restrictions imposed [were] reasonable and whether 
the interests [of the government] overr[o]de the very limited effects of the [order] on First 
Amendment rights." Radio and Television News Assn. v. United States District Court, 781 F.2d 
at 1447 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 616 (1982) (Burger, 
C.J., dissenting)). 
67. The "reasonableness" test, although deferential, does require a court to make the mini-
mal findings that pretrial publicity is likely and poses a threat to the administration of justice. 
See Jn re New York Times, 878 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1989) (gag order could not stand absent a 
finding that parties were likely to make extrajudicial statements to the press, or that such state-
ments could be prejudicial to the proceedings). 
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than other forms of regulation. 68 Prior restraints allegedly endanger 
protected speech by inducing self-censorship, 69 increasing the coverage 
of regulation, 70 and delaying dissemination of speech. 71 Prior restraint 
doctrine reflects the perception that these factors make prior restraints 
inherently more speech suppressive than subsequent restraints, and 
represents an attempt to limit their use for that reason. 72 This section 
examines the three traditional prior restraint rationales and applies 
them in the context of media challenges to participant-directed gag 
orders. This section attempts to show that media challenges to partici-
pant-directed gag orders address the speech-suppressive concerns the 
prior restraint doctrine was intended to correct. 
1. Self Censorship 
Traditional prior restraint doctrine proceeds from assumptions 
about the behavior of the party toward whom the restraint is directed. 
If a party is subject to a speech restriction, she may refrain from even 
unrestricted speech in an effort to insure that she does not violate the 
restriction. Thus, the restriction results not only in the loss of the 
restricted speech, but also in the loss of unrestricted speech that the 
speaker herself censors. This self-censorship phenomenon, referred to 
as "chilling" speech, occurs "when individuals seeking to engage in 
activity protected by the first amendment are deterred from so doing 
by governmental regulation not specifically directed at that protected 
activity."73 For example, trial participants are chilled from speaking if 
they respond to an order forbidding discussion of a defendant's testi-
mony by refraining from media contact altogether. The participants' 
fear of sanction causes them to interpret the restraint broadly, and 
thus to abstain from speech that was not prohibited by the order. 
Any chilling effect of a prior restraint is increased by the collateral 
bar rule.74 Under the collateral bar rule, courts may initiate contempt 
proceedings upon a determination that the participant violated a gag 
order, without regard for the participant's good faith or the order's 
constitutionality. 75 The participant may lose her opportunity to pro-
68. See Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment Theory, 
70 VA. L. REV. 53 (1984). 
69. Blasi, supra note 24, at 24-49. 
70. Id. at 49-63; Emerson, supra note 24, at 657. 
71. Blasi, supra note 24, at 30-33; Emerson, supra note 24, at 657. 
72. It is a subject of continual debate whether or not prior restraints are inherently more 
speech-suppressive than subsequent restraints. See, e.g., Barnett, The Puzzle of Prior Restraint, 
29 STAN. L. REV. 539 (1977); Redish, supra note 68; Sack, supra note 33; Schauer, Fear, Risk 
and the First Amendment, Unravelling the "Chilling Effect," 58 B.U. L. REV. 685 (1978). 
73. Schauer, supra note 72, at 693 (emphasis omitted). 
74. Hunter, Toward a Better Understanding of the Prior Restraint Doctrine: A Reply to Profes-
sor Mayton. 67 CORNELL L. REV. 283, 286 (1982). 
75. See In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 184 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Blasi, supra note 24, at 20. 
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test the order's constitutionality if she chooses to violate the order 
rather than to challenge it through judicial channels. 76 Although 
some courts no longer adhere to the collateral bar rule, other jurisdic-
tions continue to use it to deter participants from testing the bounda-
ries of their orders. 77 Thus, the collateral bar rule discourages trial 
participants from testing the limits of gag orders for fear they will face 
contempt proceedings without an affirmative defense based on the or-
der's unconstitutionality. 
Respect or fear of judicial authority is likely to increase risk aver-
sion among trial participants. First, a gag order is directed toward a 
small group of individuals involved in a specific trial. The personal-
ized nature of the order may "bring[] the existence of a legal prohibi-
tion and the possibility of sanctions directly to the attention" of the 
participant. 78 Participants intimidated by the individualized nature of 
the order may become overly conscious of the need to comply with the 
order to avoid contempt proceedings. Second, participants may fail to 
understand the boundaries of the judicial restrictions. Particularly 
where orders lack specificity, participants may suppress unrestricted 
speech in order to reduce the risk of violation.79 For example, a gag 
order might prohibit participants from discussing the contents of a 
criminal defendant's testimony with the media. Overlap of the defen-
dant's testimony with other evidence may leave the participant unclear 
about the limitations of the restriction. Rather than risk contempt 
proceedings, the participant may refuse to discuss any related evi-
dence, or may avoid media contact altogether. Finally, because con-
tempt proceedings are heard by the same judge who imposes the gag 
order, participants may fear that the judge will be inclined harshly to 
enforce her own order. 80 Although the judge's accountability to an 
appeals court may temper this tendency, 81 it is the participant's per-
ception that chills participant speech. Thus, even in the absence of 
judicial bias, participants who perceive such bias may become exces-
sively risk averse in complying with a gag order. 
76. Court orders restricting trial participant speech thus shift the burden of action from the 
court to the trial participants. Rather than allowing the participant to speak, which would place 
the burden on the court to act consequent to that speech, the collateral bar rule requires a trial 
participant to challenge a gag order through judicial procedures before speaking, in order to 
preserve any constitutional challenges. Blasi, supra note 24, at 28-30. 
77. See Blasi, supra note 24, at 20; Barnett, supra note 72, at 551-58. 
78. Blasi, supra note 24, at 37; see also In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 184 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1979) 
("[A] judicial order singles out particular individuals, increasing both the likelihood of punish-
ment if the order is violated, and the probability that protected speech will be chilled regardless 
of the defenses which may ultimately be available in subsequent proceedings."). 
79. Blasi, supra note 24, at 40. 
80. Id. at 23. 
81. Id. at 34. But cj Emerson, supra note 24, at 658 ("A system of prior restraint usually 
operates behind a screen of informality and partial concealment that seriously curtails opportu-
nity for public appraisal and increases the chances of discrimination and other abuse."). 
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Trial participants' perceptions of gag orders may cause them to 
suppress speech beyond the boundaries of an order. This risk of "chil-
ling" trial participant speech inures regardless of whether the gag or-
ders are challenged by the parties themselves or by media 
organizations. The result of such chilling is a reduction of the total 
communication on the part of trial participants. 
2. Risk of Over-Regulation 
Because prior restraints are imposed before the dissemination of a 
communication, they represent a speculative determination as to the 
potential harm of that speech. Advocates of prior restraint doctrine 
believe that the conjecture implicit in imposing prior restraints tends 
to "bring[] within the complex of government machinery a far greater 
amount of communication than a system of subsequent punish-
ment. "82 Gag orders, which are imposed upon a judge's estimation 
that pretrial publicity will endanger the administration of justice, incur 
this risk of over-regulation. The judge has a duty to ensure a fair trial, 
particularly where the sixth amendment rights of criminal defendants 
are involved, 83 and a typically risk-averse judge may overestimate the 
dangers of participant speech, causing her to err on the side of speech 
exclusion. 84 A judge may thus impose gag orders more frequently 
than necessary, or may impose overly inclusive orders. Although the 
judge also has a duty to act constitutionally, which arguably might 
provide a counterweight to a propensity to impose overzealous restric-
tions, 85 a judge is likely to perceive the harms risked by an unfair trial 
as greater than thqse posed by an unconstitutional gag order. Judges 
may justifiably believe that a criminal defendant is more likely to ap-
peal an unfair conviction than most trial participants, particularly dis-
interested witnesses, are to challenge a gag order. Further, a 
conviction resulting from an unfair trial is likely to be reversed, neces-
82. Emerson, supra note 24, at 656. 
83. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (reversing a murder conviction on the 
ground that the effects of excessive pretrial publicity violated the defendant's right to a fair trial). 
Although a judge's duty to insure a fair trial is greatest in the context of a criminal trial, where 
the defendant's sixth amendment rights are implicated, judges have a duty to insure the fair 
administration of justice in civil proceedings as well. See, e.g., FED R. C1v. P. 1 (courts shall 
construe the rules of civil procedure so as to "secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determina· 
tion of every action"). 
84. See Blasi, supra note 24, at 52-53 ("[J]udges tend to be unduly risk averse in ruling upon 
the daims of speakers .••. The ideal of a 'balanced assessment of competing values' is unlikely to 
be achieved in the sterile, caution-inducing environment of adjudication prior to initial 
dissemination."). 
85. See Mayton, Toward a Theory of First Amendment Process: Injunctions of Speech, Subse-
quent Punishment, and the Costs of the Prior Restraint Doctrine, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 245, 250· 
51 (1982) (asserting that the propensity for over-censorship among administrative censors is not 
shared by courts, which are more likely to be sensitive to free speech values). 
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sitating a retrial, 86 while an unconstitutional gag order will simply be 
repealed. 87 Based on her perception of the risks, a judge may tend to 
protect the integrity of her courtroom to the detriment of free speech 
considerations. 
A judge's propensity for overregulating participant speech may be 
encouraged by the relative ease of imposing a gag order. As with 
other injunctions, a judge can issue a gag order "by a simple stroke of 
a pen."88 The court may issue gag orders sua sponte, or upon a motion 
by the parties after only a limited hearing. 89 Gag orders may thus be 
imposed without the impedime.nt of a full judicial proceeding. A judge 
has little to lose by imposing such orders; they require little judicial 
time or deliberation and fulfill the judge's responsibility of providing 
the criminal defendant with an unprejudiced trial. The comparable 
ease and potential benefits of restricting participant speech thus create 
a dynamic in favor of gag orders that may result in unwarranted re-
striction of participant speech.90 
C. Delay 
Prior restraint systems cause a delay in the dissemination of speech 
that may result in the loss of the delayed speech. For example, under 
a licensing system, speech must be delayed until the speaker obtains a 
license. This delay may result in self-censorship: "[t]he speakers 
might decide not to apply for a permit because they anticipate that by 
the time the permit is issued the occasion for speaking will have 
passed."91 Alternatively, speakers may apply for the permit, "but lose 
their enthusiasm for speaking as a result of the delay to which they 
have been subjected."92 
Thus, although gag orders may be imposed only for the duration of 
a trial proceeding, they may delay trial participant speech until infor-
mation about the trial is no longer valuable to either the speaker or the 
media. A trial participant may have some reason to believe the timing 
of her speech is particularly important. If she must refrain from such 
speech until after the trial is over, she may miss her only opportunity 
86. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (criminal conviction reversed based 
on findings of excessive and prejudicial pretrial publicity). 
87. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1975) (Sixth 
Circuit issued writ of mandamus requiring lower court to vacate participant-directed gag order.). 
88. Emerson, supra note 24, at 657. 
89. Hunter, supra note 74, at 289; see also Blasi, supra note 24, at 54-63. 
90. Emerson asserts that "a system of prior restraint is so constructed as to make it easier, 
and hence more likely, that in any particular case the government will rule adversely to free 
expression." Emerson, supra note 24, at 657. Further, Emerson asserts that "personal and insti-
tutional forces inherent in the system nearly always end in a stupid, unnecessary, and extreme 
suppression." Id. at 659. · 
91. Blasi, supra note 24, at 30. 
92. Id. 
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effectively to disseminate that speech, and perhaps lose her desire to 
disseminate the speech at all.93 For example, in United States v. Tijer-
ina, 94 the Tenth Circuit approved enforcement of contempt proceed-
ings against a criminal defendant who violated a gag order by 
describing the injustice of his ongoing trial to a convention crowd in 
an attempt to incite a political uprising. The audience for his speech 
was likely available only at the convention, and his speech would 
doubtless have been less persuasive after the trial had already been 
completed. A trial participant's compliance with a gag order may 
thus cost her an opportunity for effective communication and may re-
strict her freedom to choose her preferred forum. 
In addition, tlie public may no longer have an interest in the trial 
after the trial has been completed. The media consists primarily of 
profit-oriented institutions that have no use for "obsolete and unprofit-
able" speech.95 If participant speech is delayed beyond the scope of 
public attention, the media may have little interest in obtaining and 
disseminating that information to an uninterested public. In other 
words, the media, rather than the trial participant, may lose their en-
thusiasm for speaking about the trial. As a result, delaying trial par-
ticipant speech may effectively prevent that information from reaching 
the public. 
Delaying participant speech until the trial's end may prevent the 
public from providing any check upon the judiciary until after the trial 
has become afait accompli.96 One of the primary goals of the first 
amendment has been to provide the public with the necessary informa-
tion to act as an institutional check upon government activity, includ-
ing activities of the judiciary.97 Although judicial errors might be 
identified after the trial, they can then be corrected only on appeal. 
Given the expense and delay of the appellate process, the public's in-
ability to observe judicial misconduct during the course of the trial 
may have tangible repercussions for parties involved in civil and crimi-
nal litigation. Thus, if information about a particular trial is not avail-
able while the trial is underway, the public loses the opportunity to 
respond to perceived judicial misconduct when that misconduct can be 
most easily remedied. 
Whether through participant self-censorship, profit-motivated re-
porting, or judicial overuse of gag orders, participant-directed gag or-
93. See Blasi, supra note 24, at 33. 
94. 412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 990 (1969). 
95. Emerson, supra note 24, at 657. But see Blasi, supra note 24, at 65 ("important exposes 
regarding past events usually create their own topicality"). 
96. Prior restraint doctrine expresses concern that "speech relating to the behavior of public 
officials be disseminated soon enough to permit a checking process to operate." Blasi, supra note 
24, at 65. 
97. See Emerson, supra note 24, at 658. The public's review of the judiciary is discussed 
more fully infra notes 198-204 and accompanying text. 
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ders have the potential to suppress protected speech. As a result, such 
gag orders bring about a reduction of the total amount of communica-
tion available about a particular trial. As the preceding discussion in-
dicates, prior restraint doctrine proceeds from the assumption that 
prior restraints are particularly speech-suppressive. Yet the amount of 
total speech reduction is not dependent on the status of the challeng-
ing party. When read in conjunction with New York Times Co. v. Sul-
livan, 98 prior restraint doctrine appears to be concerned with the total 
reduction of communication, a concern that is implicated by partici-
pant-directed gag orders whether challenged by the participants them-
selves or by third party media organizations. 
II. RIGHTS IMPLICATED BY PARTICIPANT-DIRECTED 
GAG ORDERS 
Although courts have recognized that media interests are affected 
by participant-directed gag orders, they have not agreed on the bases 
for those interests. This Part discusses the three different rights courts 
have found at issue in media challenges to participant-directed gag 
orders. Section ~ discusses the history and application of the public's 
right to receive information. Although no court has struck down a 
gag order as a prior restraint of the media's right to receive informa-
tion, the Second Circuit in In re Dow Jones & Co. 99 found that the 
media's interests as potential recipients of the trial participants' speech 
were sufficient to support the media's standing to challenge partici-
pant-directed gag orders. 100 Section A asserts that the right to receive 
information is the most logical basis on which to ground media chal-
lenges to participant-directed gag orders. Section B reviews the right 
to gather news, on which both the Sixth Circuit, in Columbia Broad-
casting System v. Young, 101 and the Tenth Circuit, in Journal Publish-
ing Co. v. Mechem, 102 relied to strike down gag orders as prior 
restraints. Despite these courts' holdings, this section asserts that the 
right to gather news provides only illusory grounds· for media chal-
lenges. Finally, section C discusses the right of access to trial. Two 
courts, the Arizona Supreme Court in KPNX Broadcasting Co. v. Su-
perior Court 103 and the Ninth Circuit in Radio and Television News 
Association v. United States District Court, 104 have held that the right 
of access to trial is the appropriate framework through which to ex-
amine media claims of a "right of access" to trial participants. Both 
98. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
99. 842 F.2d 603 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 377 (1988). 
100. 842 F.2d at 608. 
101. 522 F.2d 234, 240 (6th Cir. 1975). 
102. 801 F.2d 1233, 1236 (10th Cir. 1986). 
103. 139 Ariz. 246, 252, 678 P.2d 431, 437 (1984). 
104. 781 F.2d 1443, 1446 (9th Cir. 1986). 
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courts ultimately held that a right of access to trial does not contem-
plate a right of access to trial participants. While section C agrees 
with the conclusions of these courts, it asserts that the public needs the 
information trial participants can provide in order to serve as an insti-
tutional check upon the judiciary's activities. Thus, this Part con-
cludes that the right to receive information is the most appropriate 
basis for media challenges, and that this right is particularly compel-
ling in the context of participant-directed gag orders, which restrict 
information that the public needs to review judicial performance. 
A. The Public's Right To Receive Information 
The right to receive information, the right to gather news, and the 
right of access to trial share a common foundation in the Supreme 
Court's decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 105 In identifying 
the encouragement of public debate as the primary purpose of the first 
amendment, New York Times is credited with adopting Alexander 
Meiklejohn's "citizen as ruler" interpretation of the first amend-
ment.106 According to Meiklejohn, "All constitutional authority to 
govern the people of the United States belongs to the people them-
selves." 107 However, "[s]elf-government can exist only insofar as the 
[people] acquire ... intelligence, integrity, sensitivity, and generous 
devotion to the general welfare."108 Thus, the first amendment "pro-
tects the freedom of those activities of thought and communication by 
which we 'govern.' " 109 Accordingly, institutions such as the legisla-
ture, executive, and judiciary, which constitute the tools for self-gov-
ernment, may not abridge the public debate necessary to the 
maintenance of an informed citizenry.110 
Both Meiklejohn and New York Times contemplate a model of 
public debate that includes the entire communication process. 111 Pro-
tected public debate implies not only a right to speak, but a corollary 
right to receive the speech of others; i.e., a right to communicate. 112 In 
105. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The Court reversed an Alabama police official's libel award for an 
advertisement placed in the New York Times by civil rights organizations. 
106. Brennan, supra note 3; Kalven, supra note 3. 
107. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. Cr. REV. 245, 253 (1961). 
108. Id. at 255. 
109. Id. 
110. See id. 
111. See A. TAN, MASS COMMUNICATION THEORIES AND RESEARCH 53.73 (1985). Con-
sider, for example, the watershed model of communication created by engineers Claude Shannon 
and Warren Weaver: "[A]n information source selects a message from a set of messages avail-
able to him or her. This message is changed by the transmitter into a signal, which is then sent 
over the channel to the receiver, which changes the transmitted signal back into the message and 
then sends it on to the destination." Id. at 55. Under this model, the communication process is 
not complete until the message has been successfully transferred from the information source, 
through the channel, to the destination. 
112. See Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 2 ("[T]he 
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this sense, the right to receive information not only is implied, but is 
necessary, for the communication process is not complete until the 
receiver has received the sender's message. Thus, under Meiklejohn's 
theory, "the right of the citizen to receive and obtain information" 
becomes the "exclusive justification for according all persons freedom 
of speech and other First Amendment rights." 113 
Following New York Times, 114 the Supreme Court tentatively em-
braced a right to receive information.115 For example, in Lamont v. 
Postmaster General, 116 the Court struck down a statute requiring an 
addressee to submit a written request for postal delivery of Communist 
propaganda materials. 117 Although the Court did not explicitly recog-
nize a right to receive information, it found that the statute at issue 
was inconsistent with the " 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' de-
bate and discussion that are contemplated by the First Amend-
ment." Us In Stanley v. Georgia, 119 the Court, in striking down a 
statute that prohibited possession of obscene matter, noted that consti-
tutional protection of a "right to receive information and ideas" was_, 
''well-established." 120 
The Court retreated in later cases, however, from full adoption of a 
right to receive information. For example, in Kliendienst v. 
right to know serves much the same function in our society as the right to communicate. It is 
essential to personal self-fulfillment. It is a significant method for seeking a better answer. It is 
necessary for collective decisionmaking in a democratic society. And it is vital as a mechanism 
for effectuating social change without resort to violence or undue coercion."); see also Young v. 
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 76 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) ("The primary 
concern of the free speech guarantee is that there be full opportunity for expression in all its 
varied forms to convey a desired message. Vital to this concern is the corollary that there be full 
opportunity for everyone to receive the message."). 
This theory is distinct from theories that identify communicators' self-realization as the pri-
mary purpose of the first amendment. See Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. 
& PUB. AFF. 204 (1972). Iffirst amendment protection were premised on theories of self-expres-
sion, it would not include listeners' rights because such rights diffuse first amendment protection 
among both speakers and listeners. Emerson, supra, at 4-5. 
113. Emerson, supra note 112, at 4. 
114. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
115. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943), is credited with the first articulation of 
a right to receive information. While Martin preceded New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the 
Court based the right to receive information on a model of the first amendment in which public 
debate was "essential if vigorous enlightenment was ever to triumph over slothful ignorance." 
319 U.S. at 143. See also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (uphold-
ing the fairness doctrine in broadcasting on the grounds that the public has a right to hear from 
both sides of a political debate); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (right to 
receive information about contraceptives). 
116. 381 U.S. 301 (1965). 
117. 381 U.S. at 307 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)). Justice 
Brennan's concurrence asserted that the Court was upholding a right to receive information as 
established in Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943). 381 U.S. at 308 (Brennan, J., 
concurring). 
118. 381 U.S. at 306-07. 
119. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
120. 394 U.S. at 564. 
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Mandel, 121 the Court upheld the Attorney General's power to deny a 
lecturer's visa waiver without regard for other persons' interests in re-
ceiving the lecturer's speech. 122 In Procunier v. Martinez, 123 the Court 
declined to deal with a "right to hear," even though it held that mail 
censorship in federal prisons violated the rights of expression of both 
prisoners and their addressees. 124 If a right to receive information 
was, as the Stanley Court had said, "well established," it is somewhat 
surprising that it was not applied to these cases where parties were 
asserting a right to receive verbal and written communications. 
The Court followed these cases, however, with its strongest pro-
nouncement of a right to receive information, in Virginia State Board 
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. 125 In Vir-
ginia Pharmacy, the Court struck down a regulation prohibiting phar-
macists from advertising prescription medications. 126 When the 
statute was challenged by a consumers' group, 127 the Court extended 
"[first amendment] protection ... to the communication, to its source 
and to its recipients both."128 Accordingly, the Court held that the 
advertising prohibition violated consumers' first amendment right to 
receive information. 
The Court has applied the Virginia Pharmacy right to receive in-
formation in other contexts. In affirming the fairness doctrine, which 
required broadcasters to provide equal air time to competing political 
viewpoints, the Court in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC 129 held 
that the "right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of broadcast-
ers, ... is paramount."130 In First National Bank v. Bellotti, 131 the 
Court struck down a prohibition on corporate speech that "limit[ed] 
the stock of information from which members of the public may 
draw." 132 Although the corporation itself challenged the statute at 
issue in Bellotti, the Court based its decision on the need to preserve 
speech because of its value to the public. 133 Beyond these few cases, 
121. 408 U.S. 753 (1972). 
122. 408 U.S. at 770. 
123. 416 U.S. 396 (1974): 
124. 416 U.S. at 409. 
125. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
126. 425 U.S. at 770. The statute at issue provided that a pharmacist's advertising of prices, 
rebates, or ·credit terms of prescription drugs constituted unprofessional conduct. A pharmacist 
could be subject to a civil monetary penalty or revocation or suspension of her license for violat· 
ing professional standards. 425 U.S. at 752. 
127. The statute was challenged by a Virginia resident, the Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council, and the Virginia State AFL-CIO. 425 U.S. at 753 & n.10. 
128. 425 U.S. at 756. 
129. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
130. 395 U.S. at 390. 
131. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
132. 435 U.S. at 783. 
133. See 435 U.S. at 777 ("The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for 
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however, the Court has given little guidance as to the scope of a right 
to receive information. 
The Court's inconstant reliance on a right to receive information 
may stem from a concern that "focus[ing] on the more indirect and 
diffuse rights of the listener would ... tend to weaken the system [of 
first amendment protections]."134 In Zemel v. Rusk, 13s the Court re-
jected a plaintiff's claim that his right to receive information entitled 
him to a passport for travel to Cuba, in order to gain information 
about that country. The Court commented that the right to receive 
information was not "unrestrained."136 As the Court pointed out, 
"[t]here are few restrictions on action which could not be clothed by 
ingenious argument in the garb of decreased data flow." 137 The Court 
may thus be wary that a right to receive information would prove 
unadministrably broad in most contexts. 
Despite the Court's concerns, recogniiing a right to receive infor-
mation need not lead to wholesale abandonment of traditional speech 
definitions. Recipients' rights may require protection only when the 
interests of the receiver do not coincide with the interests of the com-
municator, 138 or when the communicator is unable or unwilling to as-
sert her rights. 139 In these situations, it may be desirable to allow the 
recipient to assert her interests in order to subject a communication 
restraint to judicial scrutiny. For example, in Virginia State Board of 
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. 140 the consum-
ers' (recipients') economic interest in receiving prescription drug ad-
vertisements did not coincide with the interests of the pharmacists 
(communicators) in preventing price competition.141 Pharmacists, as 
a political coalition, were unlikely to challenge a restriction they had 
placed on their own communication. Consumers, however, were con-
strained in their ability to make intelligent decisions regarding pre-
scription drugs because of the lack of available information about 
quality· and price. The only effective means of challenging the restric-
tion's constitutionality was to allow interested consumers to assert 
their right to receive the prescription adve_rtising. This may also have 
informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, asso-
ciation, union, or individual."). 
134. Emerson, supra note 112,_at 4-5. 
135. 381 U.S. 1 (1965). 
136. 381 U.S. at 17. 
137. 381 U.S. at 16-17. 
138. See Emerson, supra note 112, at 2. 
139. See id. at 7. 
140. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
141. The Virginia State Board of Pharmacy argued, however, that in fact the interests of the 
two coincided because the price competition that would result from advertising would ultimately 
harm consumers by decreasing the quality of service and raising prices. 425 U.S. at 767-68. The 
Court rejected this argument. · 
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been the case in Lamont v. Postmaster General, 142 where the speech at 
issue was promulgated by foreign publishers, who lack full constitu-
tional rights within U.S. courts, 143 and in Kliendienst v. Mandel, 144 
where the speaker was an alien with limited constitutional rights. !45 
These cases illustrate the necessity of allowing receivers to assert their 
rights as potential recipients of communication where the speakers 
cannot reasonably be expected to assert 'their right to speak. 
Under this analysis, media challenges to restrictions on trial par-
ticipants are necessary to prevent unwarranted restrictions on the par-
ticipants' speech where the participants are unwilling or unable to 
protect their own right to speak. Although the public may have an 
interest in receiving information about the trial, the parties to a trial, 
particularly a defendant in a criminal trial, may have an interest in 
suppressing such speech. While some criminal defendants may have 
an interest in making a public appeal, pretrial publicity is often detri-
mental to criminal cases.146 In such cases, a criminal defendant may 
be more likely to claim a right to suppress information than a right to 
speak. Thus, media challenges to restrictions on participant speech 
may be the only viable means of subjecting such restrictions to judicial 
review. 
Similarly, the media may wish to challenge gag orders where the 
restrained trial participants lack the resources or the incentive to 
launch a court challenge to a gag order. Witnesses, for example, may 
have little at stake in the primary litigation at issue, and thus may have 
little motivation to spend time and effort challenging a restraint on 
their speech regarding that litigation. Likewise, litigants, who bear the 
cost of the primary litigation, may be unable to spare the resources 
necessary to challenge participant-directed gag orders. A media 
agency, on the other hand, is likely to have greater resources and a 
greater financial incentive to assert communication rights. Consider 
the situation presented in Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc. 147 Residents of 
Woburn, Massachusetts sued Cryovac, Inc., alleging that Cryovac had 
released toxic chemicals into the ground, contaminating the town's 
drinking water. 148 The court prohibited the parties, their counsel, 
consultants, and experts from making public statements about the suit. 
WGBH Education Fund and CBS· challenged this order, seeking ac-
cess to information about the trial for episodes of the television shows 
142. 381 U.S. 301 (1965). 
143. Emerson, supra note 112, at 7. 
144. 408 U.S. 753 (1972). 
145. Emerson, supra 'note 112, at 7. 
146. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (excessive pretrial publicity imper· 
missibly biased jury that convicted defendant of his wife's murder). 
147. 805 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1986). 
148. 805 F.2d at 3. 
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"NOVA" and "60 Minutes," respectively. 149 The First Circuit ulti-
mately held that the order did not violate the first amendment and was 
entered upon an appropriate showing of "good cause." Given the liti-
gation expenses involved in toxic tort suits, 150 it is conceivable that a 
local organization of community residents would lack the resources to 
pursue challenges to gag orders in addition to the primary litigation 
against the chemical company.151 Both public and network television 
producers, however, have a financial interest in obtaining information 
about such controversial topics. -
Action by media organizations, which are likely to have greater 
assets as well as a greater financial incentive to challenge gag orders 
than most tort plaintiffs, may serve to protect the constitutional inter-
ests of both the media and the participants by challenging the re-
straint. Thus, media challenges based on a right to receive 
information may provide the most effective means of preventing undue 
i;estriction of trial participant communication. 
B. The Press' Right To Gather News 
When a media organization asserts a right to receive information, 
the right is often labelled a "right to gather news." Although several 
media challenges to participant-directed gag orders have rested on this 
right, 152 the right to gather news has been interpreted to be only as 
broad as the public's right to receive information. 
Suggestions of a right to gather news first appeared in the Supreme 
Court's decision in Branzburg v. Hayes. 153 Although the Branzburg 
Court held that a reporter had no privilege that would justify refusing 
to respond to a grand jury subpoena, it noted in dicta that "news gath-
ering is not without its First Amendment protections."154 After iden-
tifying this new right, the Court warned that such a right is not 
absolute, and "does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of 
special access to information not available to the public generally."155 
Since Branzburg, the Supreme Court has consistently declined to 
extend any special privileges to the press. For example, in Houchins v. 
149. 805 F.2d at 3-4. 
150. See generally P. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MAss TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE 
COURTS (1986). 
151. This argument becomes even more forceful ifthe restrained individuals are witnesses, 
rather than parties. In such a situation, the parties might have an incentive to challenge the 
orders, but cannot do so since they are not subject to the order, while the witnesses themselves 
may have little interest in fronting a challenge. 
152. See Journal Publishing Co. v. Mechem, 801 F.2d 1233 (10th Cir. 1986); Radio & Televi-
sion News Assn. v. United States Dist. Court, 781 F.2d 1443 (9th Cir. 1986); Columbia Broad-
casting Sys. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1975). 
153. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
154. 408 U.S. at 707. 
155. 408 U.S. at 684-85. 
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KQED, Inc., 156 the Court rejected the media's claim that the public's 
right to receive information implies a special right of media access to 
prison facilities and other government controlled sources of informa-
tion. The Court stated that a special privilege of access, unlike the 
public's right to receive information, is "not essential to guarantee the 
freedom to communicate or publish."157 The Court's holding implies 
that the right to gather news is illusory, affording no privileges beyond 
a general public right to receive information.158 Thus, for purposes of 
identifying a right on which to base the media's challenges to partici-
pant-directed gag orders, a public right to receive information appears 
to have more explicit support in the case law than a right to gather 
news. 
C. The Public's Right of Access to Trial 
In the context of trial proceedings, a public right to information 
about those proceedings is often discussed as a "right of access to 
trial." Because gag orders are issued in the context of trial proceed-
ings, they implicate many of the concerns at issue in a right of access 
to trial. This section reviews the origin and scope of a right of access 
to trial, including the Arizona Supreme Court's attempt in KPNX 
Broadcasting Co. v. Superior Court 159 to determine whether the pub-
lic's right of access to trial includes a right to interview trial partici-
pants. Because gag orders restrict the communications of private 
parties, rather than withholding government information, they do not 
fit squarely within the right of access to trial. However, participant 
speech may meet the same purposes as a right of access to trial, by 
providing the public with information it needs to review administra-
tion of justice. 
The Supreme Court established a right of access to criminal trial 
proceedings in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia. 160 According 
to the Supreme Court, a right of access to a particular trial proceeding 
dep~nds on an analysis of (1) the historical tradition of access to the 
156. 438 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1978). _ 
_157. 438 U.S. at 12. 
158. 438 U.S. at 12. See also Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) (no first amendment 
immunity from civil discovery order in libel suit seeking information about reporters' thoughts 
and impressions); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (first amendment did not pro-
vide newsroom with immunity from routine searches); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 
843 (1974) (reporters had no greater constitutional right of access to prison facilities than that 
accorded the general public); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (same); see Comment, News-
gathering: Second-Class Right Among First Amendment Freedoms, 53 TEXAS L. REV. 1440, 
1445-46 (1975) ("Branzburg. Saxbe, and Pell dimmed for the foreseeable future the press' hope of 
convincing the Court that the first amendment grants to the press, as a representative of the 
public, a special right of access to information of public concern."). 
159. 139 Ariz. 246, 678 P.2d 431 (1984). 
160. 448 U.S. 555 (1980). 
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particular judicial proceeding at issue161 and (2) the functional utility 
of the information that access will provide to the public in its review of 
the administration of justice.162 A later case, Press-Enterprise Co. v. 
Superior Court, 163 interpreted the Richmond Newspapers test as creat-
ing a "qualified" first amendment right of public access that could 
only be restricted where the restriction was "essential to preserve 
higher values" and "narrowly tailored" to preserve those values.164 
While the test first appeared in the context of a criminal case, several 
courts have extended this right of access to trial to the civil context.165 
Prior to Richmond Newspapers, the public's right of access to crim-
inal trial proceedings derived only from the criminal defendant's sixth 
amendment guarantee of a public trial. 166 The Richmond Newspapers 
plurality opinion, however, relied on a right to receive information as a 
corollary to the freedom to speak and publish.167 Following the lead 
of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 168 the Court derived that corollary 
from a "common core purpose" of the first amendment to assure 
"freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of 
govemment."169 Noting that such public debate is particularly desira-
ble in the context of criminal trials, 170 the Court held that the first 
amendment prohibited the government "from summarily closing 
courtroom doors which had long been open to the public at the time 
that [a]mendment was adopted." 171 The court held that criminal trial 
proceedings must be open for public attendance, "[a]bsent an overrid-
ing interest articulated in findings."172 
Justice Brennan's concurrence, in which he formulated the two-
prong right of access analysis the Court later adopted, similarly rested 
161. 448 U.S. at 564-69. 
162. 448 U.S. at 575-76; see Note, The First Amendment Right of Access to Civil Trials After 
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 286, 290-98 (1984). 
163. 478 U.S. 1 (1986). 
164. 478 U.S. at 9, 13-14. 
165. See Westmoreland v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 752 F.2d 16, 22-23 (2d Cir. 1984), 
cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1017 (1985); Publicker Indus. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1067-71 (3d Cir. 
1984); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1177-79 (6th Cir. 1983); see 
also Wilson v. American Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 1568 (11th Cir. 1985); In re Continental Ill. 
Sec. Litigation, 732 F.2d 1302, 1308-09 (7th Cir. 1984). See generally Note, supra note 162. 
166. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) (upholding closure of pretrial pro-
ceeding in the face of a media challenge. The Court found that the public had no constitutional 
right of access to a pretrial judicial proceeding independent of the defendant's right to a public 
trial under the sixth and fourteenth amendments.). 
167. 448 U.S. at 576. 
168. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
169. 448 U.S. at 575. 
170. 448 U.S. at 575 ("Plainly it would be difficult to single out any aspect of government of 
higher concern and importance to the people than the manner in which criminal trials are con-
ducted •... "). 
171. 448 U.S. at 576. 
172. 448 U.S. at 581. 
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on a public debate model of the first amendment.173 Justice Brennan 
argued that the right of access "has special force" (1) "when drawn 
from an enduring and vital tradition of public entree to particular pro-
ceedings or information"; and (2) if "access to a particular govern-
ment process is important in terms of that very process."174 Brennan 
found the first prong of this test met by a history of public trials dating 
back to English common law. 175 Under the second prong, Brennan 
found that public access to court proceedings is part of the system of 
"checks and balances" providing "an effective restraint on possible 
abuse of judicial power."176 Accordingly, Brennan found that the tra-
dition and the importance of public access to the trial process "tip the 
balance strongly toward the rule that trials must be open."177 
Justice Brennan, writing for a majority of the Court, applied this 
two-prong test in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court 178 to strike 
down a statute summarily excluding the public from all trials involv-
ing sexual crimes inflicted upon juvenile victims. Brennan followed 
Richmond Newspapers' reliance on the "common understanding that 
'a major purpose of [the first amendment] was to protect the free dis-
cussion of governmental affairs.' " 179 Brennan recognized the histori-
cal tradition of public trial, 180 and emphasized its functional utility in 
both judicial and governmental processes. "Public scrutiny of a crimi-
nal trial enhances the quality and safeguards the integrity of the 
factfinding process, with benefits to both the defendant and to society 
as a whole."181 Accordingly, the Court found mandatory trial closure 
insufficiently supported where the necessity of closing a trial to safe-
guard a minor could be determined on a case-by-case basis.182 
Because the media is interested in interviewing trial participants in 
order to receive mformation about the trial, it may be possible to char-
acterize the media's claim against participant-directed gag orders as· a 
173. 448 U.S. at 587-88 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
174. 448 U.S. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
175. 448 U.S. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
176. 448 U.S. at 592 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 
(1948)). 
177. 448 U.S. at 598 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
178. 457 U.S. 596 (1982). 
179. 457 U.S. at 604 (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)). Brennan's opin-
ion in Globe was the first majority expression of "first amendment political theory as the basis for 
a right of access to government information." Note, What Ever Happened to "The Right To 
Know"?: Access to Government-Controlled Information Since Richmond Newspapers, 73 VA. L. 
REV. 1111, 1118 (1987). · 
180. 457 U.S. at 605. Chief Justice Burger's dissent argued that the majority opinion "ig-
nore[d] the weight of historical practice." 457 U.S. at 614 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Burger's 
criticism may imply that Globe rested its finding of a right of access to trial primarily on the 
functional prong. Note, supra note 162, at 294. 
181. 457 U.S. at 606. 
182. 457 U.S. at 607-08. 
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right of access to trial. 183 The Arizona Supreme Court thus character-
ized a radio station's challenge to a participant-directed gag order in 
KPNX Broadcasting Co. v. Superior Court. 184 Applying Justice Bren-
nan's two-pronged test, KPNX held that the press did not have a right 
to interview trial participants. First, the court found that "[n]owhere 
in the extensive history of the public nature of criminal trials related in 
Richmond Newspapers can be found right of access protection for in-
terviewing trial participants."185 Next, applying the functional utility 
prong, the court found that "the significant role played by the media's 
exercise of its right of access does not depend on interviewing trial 
participants before or during the trial."186 Accordingly, KPNX held 
that the media had no right of access to trial participants. 
As the KPNX court found, the historical prong of the Richmond 
Newspapers test is the most problematic for media organizations chal-
lenging participant-directed gag orders. Restrictions on trial partici-
pant speech did not come into common usage until after the Supreme 
Court's decision in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart 187 imposed a 
virtual ban on restrictions directed at the press. 188 Prior to that time, 
courts did not need to restrict participant speech because they could 
level speech restrictions directly against the media. Historical analysis 
may accordingly reveal little in the c<;mtext of such a recent 
development. 
The Court's application of the Richmond Newspapers test, how-
ever, indicates that the test's functional prong should receive greater 
emphasis than the historical prong. In finding a right of access to trial 
proceedings in both Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia 189 and 
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 190 the Supreme Court empha-
sized the importance of public access to trial proceedings to the pub-
lic's function of providing a check upon the judiciary. In Richmond 
Newspapers, the Court found public access to trial proceedings was 
necessary to allow the public to provide "an effective restraint on pas-
183. Hunter, supra note 74, at 288-89. 
184. 139 Ariz. 246, 678 P.2d 431 (1984). 
185. 139 Ariz. at 256, 678 P.2d at 441. The court determined that a right of access to trial 
was limited to a right to "sit, listen, watch, and report." 139 Ariz. at 256, 678 P.2d at 441; see 
also Radio & Television News Assn. v. United States Dist. Court, 781 F.2d 1443, 1446 (9th Cir. 
1986). The KPNX court based its conclusion on dicta from Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Vir-
ginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) that stated: "It is not crucial whether we describe this right to attend 
criminal trials to hear, see, and communicate observations concerning them as a 'right of access,' 
or a 'right to gather information ... .' " 448 U.S. at 576. 
186. 139 Ariz. at 256, 678 P.2d at 441. 
187. 427 U.S. 539 (1976). 
188. See Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570-71 (1976) (White, J., concurring). 
189. 448 U.S. 555 (1980). . 
190. 457 U.S. 596 (1982). 
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sible abuse of judicial power."191 Again in Globe, the Court empha-
sized that "to the extent that the First Amendment embraces a right of 
access to criminal trials, it is to ensure that this constitutionally pro-
tected 'discussion of governmental affairs' is an informed one."192 
Richmond Newspapers and Globe thus establish the importance of the 
public's checking function upon the judiciary.193 
The Court's emphasis on the functional utility prong may indicate 
that it favors this prong over the historical prong. In Waller v. Geor-
gia 194 the Supreme Court held that closure of a pretrial suppression 
hearing violated a defendant's sixth amendment right to a public trial. 
Although the Court rested its decision on sixth amendment grounds, it 
impliedly relied on a corollary first amendment right of public access 
to trial proceedings.195 The opinion made no mention of a traditional 
right of access, but instead relied heavily on the functional utility of 
opening pretrial hearings to the public. 196 Waller, in conjunction with 
the emphasis on functional analysis in both Globe and Richmond 
Newspapers, may indicate that the functional prong of the Richmond 
Newspapers test is the more dispositive of the two. 197 
If emphasis is placed on the functional prong of the test, partici-
pant-directed gag orders are appropriately challenged as infringe-
ments of the media's right of access to trial. The cases establishing a 
right of access assume that the public can check adequately the func-
tioning of the judiciary only if it receives the necessary information 
about the trial. As the Supreme Court has noted, the press does not 
merely report the official version of the trial, but "guards against the 
miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judi-
191. 448 U.S. at 592 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 
(1948)). 
192. 457 U.S. at 604-05. 
193. See also Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975) ("With respect to 
judicial proceedings ... the function of the press serves to guarantee the fairness of trials and to 
bring to bear the beneficial effects of public scrutiny upon the administration of justice."); cf. 
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 839 (1978) ("The operations of the 
courts and the judicial conduct of judges are matters of utmost public concern."). 
194. 467 U.S. 39 (1984). 
195. See 467 U.S. at 46 ("[T]here can be little doubt that the explicit Sixth Amendment right 
of the accused is no less protective of a public trial than the implicit First Amendment right of 
the press and public."); see also Note, supra note 179, at 1120. 
196. See 467 U.S. at 45-47. 
197. Critics of the historical prong argue that it is of less importance because there is no 
logical link between a history of access and the rationale underlying the right of access. "There is 
no reason to believe that traditional openness is a useful proxy for the information's capacity to 
promote self-governance. Indeed, information related to many of the most important public 
issues has historically been closed." Note, supra note 179, at 1132 (footnote omitted). The Note 
cites to an example discussed in BeVier, Like Mackerel in the Moonlight: Some Reflections on 
Richmond Newspapers, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 311, 326 (1982) (quoting Richmond Newspapers, 
Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 n.11 (1980)): "Because prisons 'do not share the long tradi-
tion of openness' of trials, surely discussion of, and hence information about, prisons do not fall 
outside the first amendment's core." Note, supra note 179, at 1132 n.182. 
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cial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism."198 The 
press' ability to check the judiciary's performance is severely limited 
by restriction of its independent factfinding ability, including its ability 
to interview trial participants. 
If the government can be permitted to erect a wall of secrecy by forbid-
ding those with knowledge from talking to the press, then the right to 
attend and report what transpires is illusory; it becomes a method by 
which the government uses the press as a conduit to transmit the official 
line.199 
Trial participants can provide information to the media that has been 
excluded from the courtroom setting, including information a judge 
may find tangential but that the public still finds relevant. Further, 
the participants can present their own opinions, as interested parties, 
as to whether justice is being done. Restricting press coverage to the 
courtroom version of information eliminates the press' ability to dis-
cover material that may contradict the courtroom version, or incrimi-
nate the judge who determines what information is relevant. 
Restricting the press to a sanitized version of courtroom proceed-
ings undermines the public's confidence in both the press and the judi-
ciary. Traditionally, the public has relied on the press to provide an 
independent version of judicial proceedings. The public may react less 
spontaneously to information about a trial "when [it] know[s] that the 
speech has already passed through a regulatory filter. "200 Audiences 
will wonder if the integrity of the speech has been compromised in 
order to receive a judicial "seal of approval."201 This can harm judi-
cial efforts to maintain the appearance of integrity and justice. 
This danger is increased in the context of the judiciary, where the 
judge herself controls the release of the information that will be used 
to evaluate her performance. 202 In Nebraska Press Association v. 
Stuart, 203 Justice Brennan warned that 
[r]ecognition of any judicial authority to impose prior restraints on the 
basis of harm to the Sixth Amendment rights of particular defendants, 
especially since that harm must remain speculative, will thus inevitably 
interject judges at all levels into censorship roles that are simply inappro-
priate and impermissible under- the First Amendment. Indeed, the po-
tential for arbitrary and excessive judicial utilization of any such power 
would be exacerbated by the fact that judges and committing magistrates 
might in some cases be determining the propriety of publishing informa-
198. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966). 
199. KPNX Broadcasting Co. v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 246, 259, 678 P.2d 431, 444 
(1984) (Feldman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
200. Blasi, supra note 24, at 64. 
201. Id. at 67. 
202. Note, John Z DeLorean v. The Media, The Right to a Fair Trial Without a Prior Re-
straint Upon the Media, 15 GOLDEN GATE u. L. REV. 81, 96-97 (1985). 
203. 427 U.S. 539 (1976). 
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tion that reflects on their competence, integrity, or general performance 
on the bench. 204 
A judge's power to impose speech restrictions may thus enable her to 
conceal judicial error or impropriety. 
The court in KPNX Broadcasting Co. v. Superior Court 205 recog-
nized that the media needs guidance and analysis from variou:; parties 
to present a coherent account of a trial proceeding, but stated that the 
courts are "not constitutionally mandated to provide such gui-
dance. "206 As the dissent noted, however, the court's assertion 
"misse[d] the mark."207 Participant-directed gag orders do not merely 
constitute a judicial failure to "provide guidance"; rather, such orders 
affirmatively "prohibit[] the press from gathering news."2os In the 
context of participant-directed gag orders, the government is sup-
pressing private, rather than governmental, sources.209 Although tri-
als, particularly criminal trials, involve governmental interests, the 
information remains in the hands of private parties. The media is not 
demanding access to governmental property to which it historically 
has no claim.210 Rather, the press is seeking to interview independent 
204. 427 U.S. at 607 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
205. 139 Ariz. 246, 678 P.2d 431 (1984). 
206. 139 Ariz. at 256, 678 P.2d at 441. 
207. 139 Ariz. at 259, 687 P.2d at 444 (Feldman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
208. 139 Ariz. at 259, 678 P.2d at 444 (Feldman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
Following the KPNX court, the Ninth Circuit, in Radio and Television News Association v. 
United States Dist. Court, 781 F.2d 1443 (9th Cir. 1986), similarly misconstrued the nature of 
the order's intrusion. The court pointed out that "the media has no recourse to relief based upon 
the first amendment" when an individual refuses to give an interview, and argued that therefore 
no right should accrue when the government, rather than the individual, restricts such inter-
views. 781 F.2d at 1447. This argument fails to distinguish private action from state action. 
Individual freedom to refuse to communicate is not analogous to a state-imposed prohibition of 
communication. For example, individuals remain free to choose not to discuss politics while 
state-imposed restrictions upon an individual's freedom to discuss politics run directly afoul of 
the first amendment. See, L. TRIBE, supra note 31, at 790. The participant-directed gag order is 
thus a bar to speech that is entirely private. 
209. In Butterworth v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1376 (1990), the Supreme Court struck down the 
section of a Florida statute that prohibited witnesses to a grand jury proceeding from disclosing 
the contents of the witness' own testimony. The Court emphasized that the prohibition at issue 
vks distinct from an order prohibiting a witness from disclosing information the witness learned 
only through the course of the grand jury proceeding: "[W]e deal only with respondent's right to 
divulge information of which he was in possession before he testified before the grand jury, and 
not information which he may have obtained as a result of this participation in the proceedings of 
the grand jury." 110 S. Ct. at 1381. 
There is some overlap between government information and private information. For exam-
ple, access to jurors has traditionally been denied during the course of trial proceedings in order 
to ensure unbiased administration of justice. Likewise, restrictions on attorney access to jurors 
following the trial have sometimes been found to further compelling governmental interests in 
maintaining the integrity of the judgment. See Journal Publishing Co. v. Mechem, 801 F.2d 
1233, 1236 (10th Cir. 1986). However, the relevant information jurors can provide to the press is 
limited to the information they received through the trial proceeding. Since jurors obtain this 
information through government proceedings, it is more properly viewed as government 
information. 
210. See supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text. 
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information sources. In essence, a media challenge to participant-di-
rected gag orders is asserting the right of two private parties to com-
municate with each other.2 11 
Because gag orders restrict only private information, the inclusion 
of the media's right to interview trial participants within a broader 
right of access to trial is inappropriate. A right of access to trial is 
generally conceived of as access to the trial proceedings and to the 
materials relied on by the courts and juries in making judicial deci-
sions. 212 This conception implie8 a right to materials in the control of 
the government, rather' than a right to the speech of willing speakers, 
including the government.213 Media challenges to participant-di-
rected gag orders are not requesting the government to release infor-
mation, but to discontinue intrusion into a private communication 
relationship. Accordingly, they do not fit into the traditional concep-
tion of a right of access to government proceedings. 
A review of the public's right to receive information, the media's 
right to gather news, and a public right of access to trial thus indicates 
that the public's right to receive information provides the most tenable 
basis for media challenges to participant-directed gag orders. 
Although some media organizations have rested their challenges on a 
right to gather news, the Supreme Court's holdings indicate that the 
media's right to gather news is only as broad as the public's right to 
receive inforniation. Neither does a right of access to trial support the 
media's challenges: participant-directed gag orders restrict private 
speech rather than access to government proceedings. However, ana-
lyzing media challenges through the framework of a right of access to 
trial shows the strong public need for trial participant information in 
order to provide public review of the administration of justice. Thus, 
211. The dissent in KPNX asserted that "[t]he reporter and his informant have First Amend-
ment rights to communicate with each other." 139 Ariz. at 259, 678 P.2d at 444 (Feldman, J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
212. For example, the common law presumption of access to trial proceedings stems from a 
right of access to judicial records. This right has been limited to materials on which the court 
relies in determining the litigants' substantive rights. See In re Reporters Comm. for Freedom of 
the Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1340, 1342 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
213. Consider, for example, the Supreme Court's response to media claims of access to dis-
covery materials. In Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984), the Supreme Court held 
that the first amendment right of access to trial did not include a right to discovery materials. 
The Court categorized discovery materials as the property of the government that the govern-
ment is not willing to disclose: 
As the rules authorizing discovery were adopted by the state legislature, the processes there-
under are a matter of legislative grace. A litigant has no first amendment right of access to 
information made available only for purposes of trying his suit. Thus, continued court con-
trol over the discovered information does not raise the same specter of government censor-
ship that such control might suggest in other situations. 
467 U.S. at 32 (citations omitted). See also Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010, 
1028 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (distinguishing restrictions on discovery materials from "infringements on 
speech independently obtained from non-governmental sources"), affd. on rehearing, 737 F.2d 
1170 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("[T)he government is in a very real sense the direct source of discovered 
materials since those materials are made available only through the processes of the court."). 
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it is important that the media be able to exert its public right to receive 
information from trial participants, in order to inform public debate 
regarding judicial performance. 
III. A COMMUNICATION ORIENTED ANALYSIS OF PARTICIPANT-
DIRECTED GAG ORDERS 
As this Note has shown, participant-directed gag orders reduce 
the amount of communication and information available about trial 
proceedings. Although this reduction occurs regardless of the status 
of the challenging party, courts use status as the variable to determine 
the applicable level of review. If the challenging party is the restricted 
individual, the order is labelled a prior restraint and must survive the 
heavy presumption against prior restraints established in Nebraska 
Press Association v. Stuart. 214 If the challenging party is a media or-
ganization, the order is found not to be a prior restraint and is typi-
cally upheld under only a reasonableness standard. As a result, 
communication may be unnecessarily restricted when the media, 
rather than the restricted individual, is the only party to challenge a 
participant-directed restraint. 
The traditional prior restraint doctrine was intended to alleviate 
this type of speech suppression by prohibiting restrictions directed at 
the media. This Note asserts that participant-directed gag orders im-
plicate the same speech-suppressive concerns prior restraint doctrine 
was intended to alleviate.215 By basing protection on the rights of the 
restricted parties only, however, prior restraint doctrine fails to pro-
tect adequately against speech suppression.21 1? 
The result is a loss of the "public debate" that New York Times Co. 
v. Sullivan 217 indicated was the primary concern of the first amend-
ment. According to the Supreme Court, the first amendment ex-
presses a "profound national commitment to the principle that debate 
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."21s If 
the goal of the first amendment is the protection of public debate, first 
amendment protection must extend to all elements of communication: 
the sender, the message, and the receiver.2 19 
This Part discusses two alternatives to the judiciary's present re-
sponses to media challenges of participant-directed gag orders. Sec-
tion A argues that courts could continue to apply prior restraint 
standards to these orders, but could create an exception to traditional 
standing doctrine that would allow the media to assert the first amend-
214. 427 U.S. 539 (1976). 
215. See supra notes 68-98 and accompanying text. 
216. See supra notes 32-67 and accompanying text. 
217. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
218. 376 U.S. at 270. 
219. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
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ment nghts of the restrained speakers. As this section demonstrates, 
however, this approach may prove over-inclusive given the present 
constitutional presumption against prior restraints. 
Section B asserts that a preferable alternative would be for courts 
to recognize media claims based on a public right to receive informa-
tion, and to examine those claims under a level of intermediate or 
"heightened" scrutiny. Although the media may encounter some diffi-
culties in establishing standing to assert a publip right, these may be 
overcome by recognizing that the media suffers a financial injury from 
such restrictions that is not common to the general public. 
A. Prior Restraint Analysis Applied to Media Challenges to 
Participant-Directed Gag Orders 
In order to prevent unwarranted speech suppression, courts must 
recognize that gag orders result in the same loss of commqnication 
regardless of the status of the party challenging those orders. In its 
traditional form, prior restraint analysis prohibits speech restrictions 
only when they are challenged by the parties toward whom the restric-
tions are directed. As this Note has shown, this communicator-ori-
ented standard is unable to protect adequately the .communication 
process as a whole. Courts might, however, adapt the prior restraint 
doctrine to accommodate the claims of both speakers and potential 
receivers of speech. For example, courts might allow the media, as 
potential receivers of trial participant speech, to assert the speech 
rights of the restrained trial participants. In this way, the media could 
act to protect its interest in receiving communications in situations 
where the participants themselves are unwilling or unable to assert 
their right to disseminate these communications.220 
Ordinarily, however, a party has no standing to assert the rights of 
third parties.221 This approach would require the courts to create an 
exception to traditional standing doctrine in order to prevent unneces-
sary speech suppression. Such an exception would be analogous to the 
overbreadth doctrine. For purposes of challenging the constitutional-
ity of statutory restrictions on speech, an overbreadth challenge allows 
"[a] litigant whose expression is admittedly within the constitutionally 
valid applications of a statute . . . to assert the statute's potentially 
invalid applications with respect to other persons not before the court 
and with whom the litigant stands in no special relationship."222 
Overbreadth doctrine represents a "conscious departure from conven-
tional standing concepts" in an effort to preserve free speech, even the 
220. See supra notes 138-51 and accompanying text. 
221. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978); 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). 
222. Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. Cr. REv. 1-2 (footnote omitted). 
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speech of nonparties, from unconstitutional restriction.223 The over-
breadth claimant bases her argument on the rights of third parties, but 
is herself" 'asserting [her] own right not to be burdened by an uncon-
stitutional rule oflaw.' "224 In the context of participant-directed gag 
orders, the media is asserting its right not to be burdened by the result-
ing restriction of communication. Such challenges may be necessary 
to preserve the preference for freedom of speech expressed by both 
overbreadth analysis and prim; restraint doctrine. 
In extending standing to assert prior restraint claims, however, 
courts must recognize that the prior restraint standard is presently ap-
plied as a virtual ban on prior restraints of speech.225 Such broad ap-
plication of this doctrine could result in the prohibition of all restraints 
on both the media and trial participants. This prohibition would allow 
the courts little flexibility in responding to pretrial publicity that 
threatens to prevent the administration of a fair trial.226 This result 
indicates that the pre-publication nature of a restriction should not be 
the sole determinant of constitutionality. 
B. Recognition of the Media's Ability To Assert a Public Right To 
Receive Information from Trial Participants . 
A second alternative would be to apply a lesser degree of scrutiny 
to participant-directed gag orders, in response to challenges by either 
the restricted party or the media. This alternative abandons prior re-
straint analysis, not because it rejects the premise that prior restraints 
are inherently speech-suppressive, but because the standard protects 
only communicator interests. For example, a standard of heightened 
scrutiny - a standard not prohibitive of prior restraints, but more 
exacting than a "reasonableness" standard - would allow the imposi-
tion of some restraints, but would permit only those restrictions that 
least threaten to reduce the total amount of information available 
about the trial. 
The standard of heightened scrutiny is a softer version of the prior 
restraint test. Under the standard of heightened scrutiny, a court 
must examine "the magnitude and imminence of the threatened harm, 
the effectiveness of the protective order in preventing the harm, the 
availability of less restrictive means of doing so, and the narrowness of 
223. Id. at 1. 
224. Id. at 4 (quoting Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 
844, 848 (1970)). 
225. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
226. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (murder conviction reversed on the 
ground that excessive pretrial publicity had vitiated the possibility of a fair trial); see also Florida 
Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603, 2615 (1989) (White, J., dissenting) (noting that the privacy inter-
ests of the victim of a crime may sometimes be more compelling than similar interests on the part 
of the criminal defendant). 
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the order if it is deemed necessary."227 This test is less restrictive than 
the prior restraint test because it lacks the presumption against consti-
tutionality presently associated with that test. However, it is more re-
strictive than the "reasonableness" test. 228 First, it requires the court 
to evaluate the magnitude and imminence of the harm, rather than 
simply its likelihood. Thus, trial participant speech must pose a signif-
icant harm to the trial process in order to warrant a measure that is as 
speech-restrictive as a gag order. Second, unlike the reasonableness 
test, the heightened scrutiny test requires an order to be narrowly tai-
lored. This would eliminate broad gag orders, such as the one struck 
down in Columbia Broadcasting System v. Young 229 which had re-
stricted "all counsel and Court personnel, all parties concerned with 
this litigation, whether plaintiffs or defendants, their relatives, close 
friends, and associates" from discussing the case "in any manner 
whatsoever" with the news media.230 As a means of achieving some 
degree of consistency in review of participant-directed gag orders, the 
heightened scrutiny test approaches a middle ground between the 
prior restraint test and the reasonableness test. 
The test itself resembles the intermediate level of scrutiny applied 
to statutes. that make distinctions .based on illegitimacy, gender, or 
other quasi-suspect classifications.231 Like intermediate scrutiny, this 
softer prior restraint test eliminates the "all-or-nothing choice be-
tween minimum rationality and strict scrutiny" that presently exists 
under a communicator-oriented first amendment.232 By striking this 
middle ground, and by applying the test to claims of receivers, as well 
as communicators, consistent application of a heightened scrutiny 
standard would protect the communication process as a whole, thus 
preserving public debate as it was conceived of in New York Times Co. 
v. Sullivan. 233 
However, media organizations may face standing difficulties in as-
serting a public right to receive information. In order to merit stand-
ing, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that the challenged action has caused 
227. In re San Juan Star Co., 662 F.2d 108, 116 (1st Cir. 1981). The First Circuit applied 
this standard to restriction of access to discovery materials before the Supreme Court set forth 
the "good cause" standard in Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 34 (1984). See Ander-
son v. Cryovac, 805 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1986) (upheld restriction of media access to discovery mater-
ials under heightened scrutiny standard). 
228. See supra note 67. · 
229. 522 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1975). 
230. 522 F.2d at 236. 
231. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (classifications based on illegitimacy must be 
"substantially related to permissible state interests"); Mississippi University for Women v. Ho-
gan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (gender classifications must be "substantially related to an important 
objective"). 
232. See L. TRIBE, supra note 31, at 1609-10 (discussing the intermediate standard of scru-
tiny in the context of equal protection claims). 
233. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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her to suffer injury in fact, and (2) that "the interest sought to be pro-
tected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be 
protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in 
question."234 As Part II discusses, the Supreme Court has recognized 
first amendment protection of a public right to receive information.235 
However, courts may find that the media's claim to a public right to 
receive information may be only a "generalized grievance" that does 
not warrant standing.236 One solution would be for media organiza-
tions to argue that loss of information, particularly information about 
controversial current events, affects their ability to attract news con-
sumers, and thus causes them to suffer a financial harm not shared by 
the general public.237 By basing their claims on a public right to re-
ceive information, but alleging financial injury peculiar to media orga-
nizations, the media may be able to show a sufficiently individualized 
injury to warrant standing.238 Such an injury would be caused by the 
restriction of information, and redressed by the repeal of that 
restriction. 239 
Allowing standing to media organizations, but not to individuals, 
would, however, appear inconsistent with the Supreme Court's deci-
sions holding that the press has no privilege beyond that of the general 
public. 240 Yet media organizations would not be asserting special 
privileges; rather, they wou1~ be representing the public in asserting a 
234. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-53 (1970). 
235. See supra notes 113-33 and accompanying text. See also In re Dow Jones & Co., 854 
F.2d 603, 607 (2d Cir. 1988). 
236. Central S.C. Chapter v. Martin, 431 F. Supp. 1182, 1187-88 (D.S.C.), ajfd., 556 F.2d 
706 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978) (media had no standing to assert a right to 
receive information from trial participants where that right was "no greater nor lesser than the 
public's at large"). 
237. See International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 218 (1918) ("(N]ews 
matter, however little susceptible of ownership or dominion in the absolute sense, is stock in 
trade, to be gathered at the cost of enterprise, organization, skill, labor, and money, and to be 
distributed and sold to those who will pay money for it, as for any other merchandise."). One 
might counter that a particular media organization does not suffer financial loss if no media 
organizations have access to the information at issue. If profitability is determined relative to the 
circulation or popularity of other media forms or organizations, then no one is gaining a competi-
tive edge from such restriction. Media organizations could argue, however, that circulation and 
sales for all media organizations increase in response to certain news items. Thus, a particular 
organization is not disadvantaged relative to other media organizations, but the media industry 
as a whole is disadvantaged. 
238. In United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 
(1973), the Supreme Court allowed a group of law students to assert standing to challenge an 
increase in railroad freight rates that the students believed would result in a decrease in recycling. 
412 U.S. at 685. The Court held that the students' injury, the loss of their personal enjoyment of 
the natural environment that would result if unrecycled materials were allowed to pollute the 
environment, was sufficient to warrant their standing to challenge the rate hike. Here, the media 
is similarly alleging that its use of information is being restricted. 
239. The Supreme Court has established that the injury suffered must be "fairly traceable to 
the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief," 
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). 
240. See supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text. 
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privilege they share with the public. Media organizations might be 
considered representatives of the public for purposes of asserting the 
public's right to receive information. 241 
By recognizing the media's public right to receive information, as a 
rigl;tt separate and distinct from the trial participants' right to dissemi-
nate information, courts extend first amendment protection to the 
communication process as a whole. This interpretation of the first 
amendment is consistent with the public debate model developed by 
Alexander Meiklejohn and adopted by the Supreme Court in New 
York Times. Application of this interpretation is particularly appro-
priate in the context of trial participant speech, given the Supreme 
Court's efforts to inform public debate regarding the performance of 
the judiciary. 242 Thus, recognizing the media's right to receive infor-
mation from trial participants is the logical result· of the first amend-
ment's protection of public debate and of an informed citizenry. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the inherently reciprocal nature of communication, legal 
analysis generally affords first amendment protection only to commu-
nicators. Because the communication process is inherently reciprocal, 
a legal actor can currently achieve restriction of communication by 
restraining the receiver, rather than the communicator, without 'incur-
ring any heightened level of judicial scrutiny. Thus, following Ne-
braska Press Association v. Stuart's 243 virtual ban of prior restraints 
directed at the media, courts began to achieve the same communica-
tion restriction by directing gag orders at the trial participants. When 
the media has challenged these orders, many courts have responded by 
applying a communicator-oriented prior restraint standard that is un-
able to accommodate claims based on receivers' rights. Although par-
ticipant-directed gag orders do not intrude directly on .the media's 
operation, they necessarily restrict the media's ability to gather infor-
mation from independent sources. Unnecessary restriction of in-
dependent speech sources could undermine the public's ability to 
provide a structural check upon the judiciary's integrity. Accordingly, 
courts must apply a standard of review that can accommodate the 
public's interest in receiving trial participants' speech. 
This Note provides two alternatives.. First, the courts may con-
tinue to apply prior restraint analysis, but create an exception to tradi-
tional standing doctrine that allows the media to assert the free speech 
rights of the restricted trial participant. Given the prohibitive scrutiny 
of the prior restraint test, such an approach is likely to prove too rigid 
241. See generally Note, Divided We Fall: Associational Standing and Collective Interest, 87 
MICH. L. R.Ev. 733 (1988). 
242. See supra notes 189-93 and accompanying text. 
243. 427 U.S. 539 (1976). 
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to accommodate competing interests in protecting both the adminis-
tration of justice and a criminal defendant's sixth amendment right to 
a fair trial. 
The preferable approach is to abandon the prior restraint doctrine 
for an intermediate level of scrutiny that applies to challenges by the 
restricted party or by a member of the media asserting a right to re-
ceive the potential speech of that party. This approach reaches a mid-
dle ground between the prior restraint test and the "reasonableness" 
test currently applied, resulting in a more predictable and equitable 
standard for review. 
A drastic departure from prior restraint doctrine in this context 
poses serious questions to the doctrine in other contexts. For example, 
courts must determine if prior restraints imposed directly on the me-
dia should be examined under this intermediate standard as well. If 
the press' status is limited to that of the public's, a single standard 
would appear mandatory. However, such a solution might not ade-
quately account for intrusion into the editorial process. The Supreme 
Court's adoption of a public debate model of the first amendment in 
New York Times implies that the first amendment should focus on the 
functional utility of the speech restricted, rather than on whether the 
restraint is prior to publication or in the form of a subsequent punish-
ment. The focus of first amendment debate must shift to the total 
amount of speech that is restricted, rather than the direction of the 
restriction. Courts, as well as first amendment commentators, need to 
recognize that prior restraint doctrine is unable to protect speech ade-
quately because it imposes a communicator- oriented standard on a 
communication-oriented first amendment. 
- Rene L. Todd 
